Check pocketid_sub before hashed_password so users with a linked
passkey (and hence a null hash) get the helpful message rather than
"Invalid credentials".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- /token: reject password auth with a clear message if pocketid_sub is
set on the account — passkey-linked users must sign in via PocketID
- Link callback + auto-link-by-email: null out hashed_password when the
passkey is attached so the old hash can't be used even if the check
above were bypassed
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signing in by passkey on a fresh install created a new empty account because
the seeded admin has no email to match on. Add canonical SSO-style linking: an
authenticated user starts an OIDC flow whose `state` is a signed, short-lived
"link to user N" token (purpose=pocketid-link). The callback detects that state
and attaches the returned identity to that account instead of creating/matching
one — no reliance on emails lining up, and no group gating (the initiator is
already authorised; this is identity linking, not access control).
- auth.py: _make_link_state/_decode_link_state, GET /pocketid/link-url, callback
handles state (rejects if the passkey is already on another account →
auth_error=passkey_in_use). Expose has_passkey on /auth/me.
- Profile: "Passkey sign-in" section for all users — shows linked state or a
"Link a passkey to this account" button; success banner on return.
- Login: messages for passkey_in_use / link_failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
_get_pocketid_config / _get_allowed_group selected an admin row with an
unordered LIMIT 1. With more than one admin (e.g. the seeded password admin
plus a passkey-linked admin), this non-deterministically returned an admin
without PocketID config — making the passkey button disappear (available=false)
and group gating inconsistent. Add _config_admin() which prefers the admin that
actually has an issuer set, then falls back to the lowest-id admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
save_pocketid_config cleared the stored client secret whenever the form was
submitted with a blank secret field — but the UI hint says blank means "keep
existing". Re-saving config (e.g. to set the allowed group) therefore wiped the
secret and broke token exchange ("Token exchange failed"). Now a blank field
keeps the existing secret; only a non-empty value overwrites it.
Also log PocketID's actual token-endpoint response body on failure so the cause
(invalid_client, redirect_uri mismatch, etc.) is visible in backend logs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PocketID OIDC already auto-provisioned users keyed by pocketid_sub, and the
data layer was already fully user-scoped. This adds the missing pieces for
running real multi-user:
- auth.py callback: link by email to an existing un-linked account (so the
admin keeps their data when first signing in by passkey), collision-safe
username generation, and request the `groups` scope.
- Group gating: optional pocketid_allowed_group (admin-config or
POCKETID_ALLOWED_GROUP env); users lacking the group are rejected at the
callback and redirected to /login?auth_error=not_authorized.
- New admin users API (app/api/users.py): list users, promote/demote admin
(guards against demoting/locking out the last admin or yourself), and delete
a user with ordered bulk deletes of all their data + on-disk files.
- ProfilePage: allowed-group field; LoginPage: rejected-login message;
Layout: admin-only Users nav; new UsersPage.
Resync milevault_export to current source (it had drifted many features behind
— missing garmin_sync, npm-ci Dockerfile and @polyline-codec that broke its own
CI) and add POCKETID_ALLOWED_GROUP to .env.example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
owain